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The early  1980s was  a period  of  turbulence in the  municipal bond 
market. Interest rates on tax-exempt securities reached record heights, 
both in nominal terms and relative to comparably risky taxable bonds. 
Between January 1980 and January 1982, the yield differential between 
prime long-term municipal bonds and U.S. Treasury obligations fell 
from 375 to  175  basis points.  The yield  spread on short-term bonds 
also declined, but by a smaller amount. The income tax rate at which 
an investor would be indifferent between holding long-term taxable or 
tax-exempt securities declined dramatically, from 35% to less than 15%. 
During the same period, voter resistance to higher taxes, recession- 
induced service demands, and reductions in federal grants increased 
state and local borrowing by nearly 50%, even though many jurisdic- 
tions postponed capital expenditures because of high interest rates. 
The escalation of tax-exempt interest rates has been attributed to 
many factors. Increased municipal risk, an increased supply of tax- 
exempt securities such as industrial revenue bonds, falling marginal 
tax rates among personal investors, and changes in commercial bank 
behavior have all been advanced as possible explanations.' The shrink- 
ing yield differential between  taxable and tax-exempt  securities has 
germinated many proposals designed to reduce the real cost of debt 
finance by altering municipal borrowing practices. Proposals include 
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increased use of short-term debt, issuing “put  bonds”  that grant the 
bondholder the right to terminate his debt contract after a fixed number 
of years, and use of floating-rate long-term bonds. There has also been 
renewed  interest in the long-standing plan for replacing the current 
income tax exemption for municipal interest with a federal subsidy to 
state and  local borrowing.  The likely impact  of  these proposals on 
municipal interest costs is controversial, largely because of disagree- 
ment over the forces behind the recent increase in tax-exempt interest 
rates. 
There are several competing theories of how equilibrium yields are 
determined in the municipal bond market. One view holds that com- 
mercial banks are the marginal holders of  municipal debt, since they 
are the only class of investors who are able to borrow at the after-tax 
interest rate  and invest  the proceeds  in  tax-exempt  securities. This 
view implies that only the tax rates facing commercial banks should 
affect the municipal-taxable yield  spread. A second view, which has 
developed  from  research on a theory of  corporate capital  structure 
proposed  by  Merton  Miller  (1977),  also relates the yield  spread to 
corporate tax rates. In Miller’s model, changes in the relative supplies 
of corporate debt and corporate equity ensure that the marginal investor 
choosing between holding taxable and tax-exempt debt faces an interest 
tax rate equal to the statutory corporate rate. The model predicts that 
changes in investor tax rates should have no effect on the relative prices 
of  taxable and tax-exempt bonds, although they might affect the equi- 
librium quantities of different securities. 
A third and more traditional view, described by Mussa and Kormendi 
(1979) and Hendershott and Koch (1977), holds that the municipal bond 
market is segmented by maturities. Different classes of investors hold 
long- and short-term bonds, with banks predominating at short matur- 
ities and households purchasing most long-term debt. Under this view, 
personal tax changes should affect the yield spread on long-term bonds, 
but should have little impact on the relative yields on short-term taxable 
and tax-exempt bonds. 
This paper examines the impact of changing tax expectations on the 
taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. In particular, it tests the hypothesis 
that downward revisions in expected personal tax rates can lower the 
yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt debt. Only the third model 
predicts that such changes should affect relative bond prices. By ex- 
amining data from four events that substantially altered tax rates-the 
1964 Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, the Vietnam War tax surcharge, the 
1969 Tax Reform Act, and the  1981 tax cut-this  study provides new 
evidence that both personal and corporate tax changes affect the rel- 
ative yields on taxable and tax-free bonds.  These results help distin- 
guish among the competing models of  municipal market equilibrium, 7  Explaining the Yield Spread 
and illuminate questions about how various policy changes would affect 
municipal borrowing costs. 
The findings also suggest that expected tax changes explain a sizable 
fraction of the recent narrowing in the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. 
The passage  of  the  1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act was contem- 
poraneous with a 25% reduction in the yield spread between long-term 
municipal and taxable bonds. Although tax reforms cannot explain the 
entire increase in tax-exempt yields relative to taxable yields during 
the early 1980s, they appear to have had a significant effect. 
This paper is divided into five sections. The first chronicles move- 
ments in municipal borrowing costs during the last three decades. The 
second section presents the three competing models of municipal debt 
pricing in greater detail and identifies the predictions of each regarding 
the impact of tax changes on yield spreads. The third section describes 
my data set and explains the procedure that was used to identify periods 
of changing tax expectations.  The fourth section presents  empirical 
evidence on the effects of tax changes during the last two decades on 
the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. The concluding section reviews 
the implications of my  results for proposals to reform municipal bor- 
rowing policies. 
2.1  Recent Movements in Municipal Borrowing Costs 
This section describes recent movements in the yield spread between 
taxable and tax-exempt interest rates. Monthly interest rate data were 
obtained from Salomon Brothers’ Analytical Record of  Yields and Yield 
Spreads. These data, derived  from yield curves for par bonds with 
current issue characteristics, are calculated on the first of each month. 
The  differential between  taxable  and  tax-exempt  yields  can  be  de- 
scribed by the implicit tax rate, O’,  which would characterize an investor 
who was indifferent between the two yields. This tax rate is defined 
by (1 - OqR  = RM, where R is the yield on a taxable bond and RM  is 
the yield on a comparably risky tax-exempt security. 
The implicit tax rates reported here are calculated from yields on 
newly issued Treasury securities and prime-grade general obligation 
tax-exempt bonds. Both securities are close to riskless.2 “Prime”  is 
the highest rating awarded to municipal bonds by Salomon Brothers. 
The restriction to general  obligation bonds is also important,  since 
many  recent  events  such  as  the  Washington Public  Power  Supply 
System default have altered the perceived riskiness of revenue bonds 
issued by  states and localities. These developments should have had 
a much  smaller  effect  on  the market for general  obligation bonds, 
which  are  backed  by  the  ‘‘full  faith  and  credit”  of  the  issuing 
government. 8  James M. Poterba 
Table 2.1 reports annual average values of  the implicit tax rates on 
one-, five-, ten-, and twenty-year bonds for the period  1955-83.  The 
series show pronounced declines in the implied tax rates on both long- 
and  short-maturity bonds between  1979 and  1982. The twenty-year 
implied tax rate declined by more than twenty percentage points during 
Table 2.1  Tax Rates Implied by Taxable and Tax-exempt Bond Yields, 
1955-83 
Treasury bonds versus prime-grade municipals 
20-year  10-year  5-year  I-year 







































































































































































SOURCE:  Salomon Brothers, Analytical Record of  Yields and Yield Spreads and author’s 
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this period.  The tax rates implied by  short-term yields declined less 
dramatically, from  50 to 42%. These changes  are larger than  those 
observed in any other three-year period in the postwar era. 
The table also shows that in every year the implicit tax rate on short- 
term bonds was substantially higher than that on any of the long-term 
bonds. The divergence was most pronounced in the late 1960s and early 
1980s, when the difference between the implicit tax rates on one- and 
twenty-year bonds exceeded twenty-five percentage points. There are 
also persistent differences in the levels of long- and short-term munic- 
ipal interest rates. Throughout the postwar period, long-term tax-exempt 
interest rates have exceeded short-term rates, often by as much as 50%. 
The perennial upward  slope in  the tax-exempt term  structure is the 
motivation for some recent proposals to increase state and local short- 
term borrowing. 
Several warnings about the use of implied tax rates must be issued 
before drawing strong conclusions from the data in table 2.1. First, if 
there are differential expected capital gains on municipal and Treasury 
bonds, then the implied tax rates will not reflect marginal interest tax 
rates.3 If the expected capital gain on a taxable bond is larger than that 
on a comparable tax-exempt  bond, then their yields to maturity will 
be closer than they would be assuming equal capital gains. This will 
bias the implied tax rate toward zero. 
Tax  reforms are one source of capital gains and losses. If tax rates 
are expected to decline, then the value of tax exemption will diminish 
and the holders of tax-exempt  bonds will experience capital losses. 
The implied tax rate on long-maturity bonds will therefore be below 
the current tax rates facing investors. The yield spread between short- 
term taxable and tax-exempt bonds should depend on current tax rules, 
while the spread at longer maturities depends on the expected path of 
tax rates over a longer horizon. 
A second problem in comparing the yields on different bonds arises 
because long-term bonds provide their holders with the opportunity to 
engage in tax-trading strategies. Investors should therefore require a 
lower coupon yield than on short-maturity bonds of  comparable risk. 
This contaminates inferences about the term structure of implied tax 
rates, and it may also contaminate the estimated yield differential be- 
tween taxable and tax-exempt bonds of the same maturity. Constan- 
tinides and Ingersoll(l984) find that the tax-timing option on municipal 
securities is worth substantially less than the option on taxable bonds, 
primarily because there are no tax advantages associated with estab- 
lishing an above-par basis in a municipal bond. The implied tax rate 
calculated  from  yields to maturity  will  therefore  underestimate  the 
actual tax rates  on investors, with  larger biases for longer-maturity 10  James M. Poterba 
bonds. These biases can cause large errors in the levels of implied tax 
rates calculated from long-term yield data. However, the changes in 
implied tax rates, which I focus on, may be less subject to these bia~es.~ 
A third difficulty with implied tax rates is caused by differential risk. 
If prime municipals are riskier than Treasury bonds, then the estimated 
marginal tax rates are biased downward. Moreover, there may be a 
larger risk differential between long-term municipal and Treasury bonds 
than between  short-term bonds of these types, implying that the bias 
is greater on long-maturity bonds. If the perceived riskiness of munic- 
ipal securities has increased in recent years because of near-defaults 
or taxpayer revolts, it could account for declining implicit tax rates. 
However, the change in default probabilities required  to explain the 
recent narrowing of  the yield spread is implausibly large.5 
This paper focuses on the effects of  expected tax changes in ex- 
plaining monthly changes in the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. The 
next section outlines several models with different predictions about 
which tax rates determine the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. Sub- 
sequent sections provide empirical evidence on how announcements 
of impending tax reform influence the relative  yields of  taxable and 
tax-exempt bonds. 
2.2  Alternative Models of Municipal Bond Market Equilibrium 
The prices  of  taxable and tax-exempt bonds are determined in  a 
financial general equilibrium. Any  analysis of the relative yields on 
taxable and municipal bonds must therefore specify the behavior of 
firms and governments that supply these assets as well as the investors 
who demand them. This section discusses three competing theories of 
the determination of  the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. They gen- 
erate different predictions regarding how changing tax  expectations 
should affect the implied tax rates calculated from yields to maturity. 
2.2.1  The Bank Arbitrage Hypothesis 
The first model was developed by Eugene Fama (1977) and has sub- 
sequently received favorable empirical support from Skelton (1983). 
Fama noted that one class of investors, commercial banks, can operate 
simultaneously in both the taxable and tax-exempt bond markets. Un- 
like most other investors, banks are permitted to deduct interest pay- 
ments from their taxable profits even while investing in tax-exempt 
securities. If  the tax-exempt yield, RM,  exceeds the after-tax cost of 
bank borrowing (1 - T)R,  where 7  is the corporate tax rate and R is 
the taxable interest  rate,  then  commercial  banks  will  issue taxable 
bonds or notes and purchase municipal securities. By demanding mu- 
nicipal bonds, banks will drive up prices and lower yields until Rw = 11  Explaining the Yield Spread 
(1 -  T)R.  Alternatively, if municipal yields are below this level, banks 
will reduce their holdings of municipal bonds and use the proceeds to 
extend other loans. Since banks have held large amounts of municipal 
debt for most of the past three decades, and currently own more than 
one-third of outstanding state and local debt, they have ample reserves 
to undertake  these  portfolio  adjustments.  This model  suggests  that 
while the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds should 
be stable, the monthly changes in commercial bank holdings of mu- 
nicipal debt could be quite volatile. 
There seems little doubt that banks undertake the tax arbitrage trans- 
actions described above, especially with short-term bonds.6 Beek (1982) 
reports that 52% of the tax-exempt debt held by commercial banks is 
of less than one-year maturity,while 92% of bank holdings has matur- 
ities of less than five years. The role of banks in performing tax arbitrage 
with long-term bonds is more doubtful, and may be restricted by  in- 
stitutional limitations and other factors. Skelton notes that 
banks may deduct the interest payments on debt obligations incurred 
in the normal course of business while receiving tax-exempt coupon 
payments . . .  however, liabilities with maturities in excess of three 
years are considered to be potential contributions to capital and as 
such are subject to scrutiny of the tax authorities. In addition, long 
term debt issues by banks must be approved by the Comptroller of 
the Currency and the FDIC who, as a rule, limit such financing to 
one third of total capital. This special opportunity for banks, there- 
fore, is limited to the short end of the maturity spectrum. [Skelton 
1983, 3461 
Even if banks cannot issue long-maturity debt, of course, they should 
be able to undertake arbitrage in the long-term market by issuing short- 
term securities while purchasing long-term bonds. This exposes them 
to some real interest rate risk, but this is a type of risk that they are 
frequently called upon to hedge. 
The bank  arbitrage analysis  implies that  changes in  the  stock of 
municipal debt outstanding will have no impact on the relative yields 
of taxable and tax-exempt debt. Changes in security volume will re- 
quire more or less borrowing or lending by banks, but  the relative 
yields will not change. In this model, we do not have to explain the 
debt-supply behavior  of  states and  localities  in  order to determine 
equilibrium prices. 
Tax  changes, however,  can affect the yield  spread. A  temporary 
reduction in the corporate tax rate will lead to a substantial narrowing 
of the short-term yield  spread but only a small change in long-term 
yields. A reduction in expected future corporate tax rates would reduce 
the current yield spread on long-maturity bonds, with no effect on short- 12  James M. Poterba 
term yields. More importantly, the model suggests that personal  tax 
rates are irrelevant for determining municipal interest rates. 
The bank arbitrage model suggests that, absent any variation over 
time in expected corporate tax rates, divergences in the yields on tax- 
able and tax-exempt bonds at varying maturities must be attributable 
to the risk characteristics  of the different securities. Fama (1977) argues 
that although yields  to maturity  on comparably rated corporate and 
municipal  bonds frequently  imply  tax rates below the corporate tax 
rate, especially at long maturities, this is due to inadequate risk com- 
parison.  He suggests that since bondholders are less able to enforce 
restrictive covenants against municipal than against corporate borrow- 
ers, and since local government assets are virtually impossible to seize 
during bankruptcy, tax-exempt bonds are riskier than corporate debt. 
These factors, combined with  uncertainties  about future political ac- 
tions, induce higher yields on long-maturity municipal bonds than on 
top-quality corporate debt. 
One piece  of  evidence against this explanation  of  long-term  yield 
differentials was provided by Gordon and Malkiel (1981). They com- 
pared the yields on long-term corporate bonds and industrial revenue 
bonds that were backed by the same firms. These bonds were similar 
in all respects except their tax treatment, with the industrial revenue 
bonds  providing  tax-exempt  interest. The yields  on these securities 
suggested implied tax rates of about 25%, substantially lower than the 
prevailing  corporate  tax  rate.  Differential  risk  cannot  explain  this 
divergence. 
The bank arbitrage model is appealing for its simple account of equi- 
librium pricing in  the municipal bond market. However, it may be of 
limited relevance for describing future developments in this market. 
Table 2.2 shows the holdings of municipal debt by commercial banks, 
households, and property and casualty insurance companies during the 
period since 1955. Commercial banks’ share of the tax-exempt market 
has  declined  in  each of  the last  eleven  years. Their holdings  have 
declined precipitously since 1980, falling from 42% of the outstanding 
stock to just over 33% at the beginning of 1984. As a result, households 
have become increasingly important as holders of municipal debt. 
The recent decline in commercial bank activity in municipal debt is 
attributable to three factors. First, changes in the availability of other 
sources of tax-sheltered income, particularly the rise in leasing since 
1980, have reduced commercial banks’ reliance on tax-exempt bonds 
as a device for lowering tax liability.  Second, bank  profits were de- 
pressed  in  1981  and  1982; this diminished  the need  for tax-exempt 
income. Finally, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
limited banks’ interest deductions to 85% of the carrying costs of their 
municipal bond investments. This reduced the attractiveness of the tax 13  Explaining the Yield Spread 
arbitrage described  above, and led to increased investment in  other 
assets. The future role of commercial banks in  the municipal market 
remains uncertain. 
2.2.2.  The Miller Model 
The second model of the municipal market was developed by Merton 
Miller (1977), primarily to analyze questions about corporate capital 
structure. It emphasizes the role of corporations as suppliers of debt 
and equity in determining the pattern of equilibrium yields. To highlight 
the role of tax clienteles, I shall present the model in a world of certainty. 
First, consider the situation in which there are no municipal bonds. 
Firms earn a fixed pretax return R on their investments. If a firm is 
financed exclusively with debt, then the after-tax return received by 
its owners is (1 - m)R,  where m is the investors’ tax rate on interest 
income. Since for tax purposes interest payments are deductible from 
corporate profits, corporate profits tax liability equals zero. By com- 
parison, if the firm were financed with equity, shareholders would re- 
ceive an after-tax return of (1 -  T)(I - T,)R, where T, is the effective 
marginal tax rate on equity income and T is the corporate tax rate. If 
shareholders face different marginal tax rates, then those for whom 
(I - rn) >  (1 -  T)( 1 -  T,)  will hold debt while those for whom (1 -  rn) 
d  (1 -  ~)(1  -  T,)  will invest in equity. This condition can be rewritten 
as T  S  (rn -  ~~)/(l  -  T,).  In equilibrium, investors will be completely 
specialized in holding either debt or equity. 
Aggregate corporate financial policy is determined by the relationship 
(Debt/Equity) = q,  where 
(*) 
The relative returns on debt and equity satisfy 
Net Worth Held by Investors with (rn - ~,)/(l  -  7,) < T  ’  = Net Worth Held by Investors with (rn - ~,)/(l -  7,) 3  T  ’ 
(2)  (1 -  T,*)Req  = (1 - m*)R 
where the pretax equity return is Re, = (1 - T)R.  The marginal tax 
rates facing investors who are indifferent between debt and equity are 
indicated by asterisks; they satisfy (1 - ~,*)(1 - T)R  = (1 - m*)R. 
Corporations adjust their debt- equity ratios to ensure that all investors 
for whom (1 - 7,)Req  exceeds (1 - rn)R are able to hold equity, and 
all those for whom (1 - m)R  2 (1 -  T,)&  can hold debt. 
Tax-exempt debt, M, can be introduced into this framework.’ If there 
are no taxes on equity income and there is no uncertainty, then mu- 
nicipal debt and corporate equity are perfect substitutes and they must 
have the same return. This return must equal (1 - T)R.  If there are 
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NOTE:  The first three columns report the fraction of state and local obligations outstanding at the end of 
each year which are held by each class of investor. The last three columns report the ratio of the change 
in each investor class’s holdings to the total change in debt outstanding. Data are drawn from the flow 
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those for whom RM  3  (1 - m)R and RM  2  (1 -  ~,)(1 - T)R.  Figure 
2.1 summarizes the relationship between an investor’s tax rate and his 
portfolio composition, assuming that equity tax rates are a linear func- 
tion of those on interest income.8 The diagram makes clear that mu- 
nicipal bondholders are investors who, in  the absence of  tax-exempt 
debt, would have held equity. There is a critical value of T, at which, 
given RM,  investors will be indifferent between holding tax-exempt debt 
and taxable equity. The value of  T, such that  (1 - T,)R,~  = RM  will 
be defined as T,**;  it corresponds to the “marginal  investor”  in mu- 
nicipal bonds. Given a stock of  municipal debt M,  the relative yield 
on taxable and tax-exempt debt is determined by finding T,**  such that 
the total wealth held by investors with T, 3  T,**  and T  < (m - T,)/ 
(1 -  7,) equals M.  Municipal and corporate bond yields are then related 
by 
(3)  R, = (1 -  7,**)Req  = (1 -  ~,**)(1 - T)R. 
In this model, changes in the stock of municipal debt have two effects. 
First, an increase in M will lower the value of T,**,  since more investors 
must be  induced to hold municipal debt instead of equity. This will 
reduce the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt debt, since 
(4)  R -  RM = (T + ~,**(1 -  T))R. 
In addition, changing the supply of municipal debt will lead to offsetting 
adjustments in corporate debt-equity ratios. The precise nature of this 
Corporate  debt  Corporale  equily 
Fig. 2.1  Asset choice in the Miller Model 17  Explaining the Yield Spread 
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Fig. 2.2  Asset choice in the Miller Model I (7, = 0) 
effect depends crucially on whether issuing municipal bonds induces 
a change in the level of  private  savings. Assuming that total savings 
are unaffected by an increase in the stock of municipal debt, each dollar 
of  municipal debt displaces one dollar of  corporate equity. The cor- 
porate debt-equity ratio will satisfy 
M  D 
-  E  = $1  + 2). 
Increasing the stock of municipal debt will therefore raise the corporate 
debt-equity ratio. 
If issuing municipal bonds induces a change in private savings, then 
the effect on the corporate debt-equity ratio is unclear. If all additional 
savings come from investors for whom (1 -  T) b (1 - m)/(l - T~), 
investors who hold equity in equilibrium, then the debt-equity ratio 
will rise by less than it would in the fixed-savings case. If, however, 
there is increased savings from individuals for whom (1 -  T)  =s (1 - m)/ 
(1 - T~),  then the debt-equity ratio might decline by more than the 
amount predicted in (5). 
In considering the effect of  tax changes on the yield  spread, it is 
helpful to distinguish between two versions of the Miller model. They 
will be labelled Miller Model I and Miller Model 11.  The first model, 
which was presented by Miller (1977) and subsequently supported by 
Trzcinka (1982) and others, holds that the effective tax rate on equity 
income is zero. This case, which is a special case of the T, # 0 model, 
is shown graphically in figure 2.2. If the equity tax rate is zero, then 
the previous conclusions with respect to changing the stock of munic- 18  James M. Poterba 
ipal debt no longer obtain. Provided M is less than the total wealth of 
individuals for whom (1 - m)  S  (1 -  T), changes in the stock of tax- 
exempt debt will have no effect on RM. Since ?,**  = 0, RM = (1 -  7) 
R  regardless of  relative  security supplies.  As in  the bank  arbitrage 
model, changes in the personal tax code will have no impact on the 
yield  spread  between  taxable  and  tax-exempt  debt.  Corporate  tax 
changes will, however, alter the yield spread between taxable and tax- 
exempt bonds. 
The predictions of this model are therefore identical to those of the 
bank arbitrage model. The mechanism that ensures that Rw = (1 -  7) 
R  is different, however. This provides one way of distinguishing be- 
tween the two views. When there are changes in the tax rates or rules 
applying to banks, but not other firms, the bank arbitrage model pre- 
dicts that there will be changes in the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. 
Miller Model I makes no such prediction. 
The second version of  the Miller model, which I have already de- 
scribed above, allows for the possibility that equity tax rates are pos- 
itive. This view is supported by the observation that since part of the 
return to equity holders is through dividend payments, 7, = (1 - a)z 
+ am,  where a  is the firm’s payout ratio, z is the effective tax rate on 
capital gains, and rn is the dividend tax rate. In many cases the dividend 
and interest  tax  rates are equal. Even if  capital gains are untaxed, 
therefore, the dividend tax burden should make T, greater than zero. 
Although Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982) have argued that the inter- 
action of various tax code provisions makes the effective dividend tax 
rate zero, their view seems contradicted by evidence on both the tax 
status of investors (Feenberg 1981) and some findings on the behavior 
of share prices and corporate dividend decisions (Poterba and Summers 
1985). 
In Miller Model 11, a change in either the corporate tax rate or the 
provisions  of the personal  tax code affecting the tax rate on equity 
income will  alter the yield  spread  between  taxable and  tax-exempt 
bonds of comparable risk. A change in the stock of  tax-exempt debt 
could also affect the yield spread, as described above. Increased mu- 
nicipal borrowing reduces T~**  and thereby narrows the yield spread. 
The strict predictions described above about investor specialization 
in  only one asset depend crucially upon  that  assumption of perfect 
certainty. When corporate debt, equity, and tax-exempt bonds are all 
risky assets, portfolio choices will not be determined solely by  tax 
considerations. Auerbach and King (1983) discuss these issues in greater 
detail. 
2.2.3  The Preferred Habitat Model 
The bank arbitrage model and both Miller models ignore the agency 
and transactions costs associated with corporate and municipal finance. 19  Explaining the Yield Spread 
Firms often incur costs from issuing debt rather than eq~ity.~  Maturity 
matching, in which firms, states, and localities attempt to incur liabil- 
ities with maturities roughly equal to those of their assets, also appears 
to be a prevalent practice. These market imperfections  may restrict 
movement to equilibrium in the models described above. 
A final view of municipal market equilibrium, the “preferred habitat” 
model, holds that states and municipalities have distinct maturity pref- 
erences when issuing different types of debt. Legal restrictions and 
other factors lead to the use of long-term bonds when financing capital 
expenditures, and the use of short-term debt primarily to smooth fluc- 
tuations in  revenues.  Other institutional constraints and a desire for 
maturity matching on the part of lenders lead different classes of invesi 
tors to hold short- and long-term municipal bonds. Thus, the markets 
for short- and long-term municipal debt are not linked by any operative 
arbitrage mechanism, either on the part of  suppliers (states and local- 
ities) or demanders of debt. 
This view explains the divergence in the implied tax rate on short- 
and long-term bonds as due to the varying tax rates facing the demand- 
ers of  municipal debt  of  different maturities.  Mussa and Kormendi 
(1979) present a clear description: 
Commercial banks are the dominant holders of short-term municipal 
bonds and also hold short-term taxable instruments with essentially 
the same risk and other characteristics. The yield differential between 
short-term municipal bonds and comparable short-term taxable in- 
struments is close to the corporate tax rate of 48 percent, since this 
is the yield differential that offsets the tax advantage of  short-term 
municipal bonds for the dominant holder of  such bonds. For long- 
term municipal bonds, the yield differential is not set by the tax rate 
for commercial banks. Banks hold long-term municipal bonds, but 
they do not hold any significant  amount of long-term corporate bonds. 
Hence, the investor who is just balancing between  long-term mu- 
nicipal bonds and long-term corporate bonds cannot be a bank but 
must be some other investor. For this investor, the equalizing yield 
differential is not 48 percent but only about 30 percent. [Mussa and 
Kormendi 1979, 71 
This model suggests that the short-term municipal market behaves ac- 
cording to the bank arbitrage model, while at long maturities  Miller 
Model I1 is a more accurate description of the market. 
Under this view, the effect of changing the stock of outstanding debt 
will depend upon the maturity at which it is issued. Short-term bond 
issues will not change the implied tax rate on short-maturity municipal 
debt, while long-term bonds may have an impact on the relative pricing 
of  taxable  and tax-exempt securities. The model’s predictions with 
regard to tax changes are also a mix of the previous results. Corporate 
tax changes will  affect both the short- and long-term yield spread be- 20  James M. Poterba 
tween taxable and tax-exempt debt. The effect of personal tax changes, 
however, will be confined to the long-term yield spread. 
The “preferred habitat” model provides an account of why the im- 
plied tax rates on long- and short-term municipal debt may differ. How- 
ever, it also emphasizes our lack of understanding of municipal financial 
policy, since it raises a puzzle: Why do municipalities issue long-term 
debt? If the upward-sloping tax-exempt term structure is partly due to 
the maturity preference of municipal bondholders, and high tax bracket 
investors prefer short-maturity bonds, then states and localities could 
reduce their borrowing burden by issuing short-term  securities.  One 
explanation of their failure to do this is that there are substantial trans- 
actions  or administrative  costs  associated with  rolling  over  short- 
maturity debt, or raising taxes to pay off principal during a liquidity 
crisis. This argument is more persuasive in the case of small townships 
or municipalities than for cities and states with ongoing financial needs, 
since the latter are involved in frequent debt issues. 
A second reason for the reluctance to use roll-over short-term debt 
may be that interest payments over the course of a year become un- 
certain. This could impede budgeting, create situations in which tax 
revenues would  not  fully  cover expenses, or require  more frequent 
changes in  tax rates than under a  system with  fixed-rate  long-term 
finance. Finally, the municipalities’ fear of credit rationing cannot be 
ignored. Prior to the New York City crisis in  1974-75,  53% of state 
and local debt issues were at short maturities. This declined to 35% in 
1976 and 1977, and it has not exceeded 40% since then.](’  Beek (1982) 
suggests that the danger of being unable to refinance a short-term bond 
issue is frequently a reason for issuing long-term debt. 
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the three views of municipal market 
equilibrium that have been described in this section. It outlines their 
Fig. 2.3  The demand curve for municipal debt, different equilibrium 
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Table 2.3  Summary of Alternative  Models of Municipal Market Equilibrium 
Effect on taxable-tax  exempt yield spread (by maturity) 
Increasing  Raising  Raising 
stock of  corporate  personal 
Equilibrium  municipal debt  tax rates  tax rates 
model  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long 
Bank 
arbitrage 
model  none  none 
Miller 
Model I 
(7e = 0)  none  none 
Miller 
Model I1 
(7e f 0) 
Preferred 
habitat 
model  none  4  ?  none  $. 
*Some personal tax changes could have an effect by eliminating the provisions of  the 
tax code which Miller and Scholes (1978) argue permit investors to reduce their equity 
tax burden to zero. 
none  none  c  c 
.c.  c 
none'  none- 
4  4  t  t  c+ 
t 
predictions for how tax changes and changes in the stock of municipal 
debt affect yield spreads. The shape of the demand curve for municipal 
debt under each of  the competing hypotheses is shown in figure 2.3. 
The horizontal demand curves for municipal securities correspond to 
either the bank arbitrage model or Miller Model I. The upward-sloping 
demand curve reflects either the preferred habitat model at long ma- 
turities or Miller Model 11.  The next two sections develop empirical 
tests that try to distinguish between these views. 
2.3  Empirical Methods 
The competing views of the municipal market can be tested by ex- 
amining the reaction of long- and short-term yield spreads to changes 
in expectations about tax policy. Changes in current corporate tax rates 
should affect short-term yield spreads under all views. Miller Model 
I1 and the preferred habitat theory suggest that movements in expected 
personal tax rates should show up in long-term yield differentials, while 
the bank arbitrage model and Miller Model I suggest that only changes 
in future corporate rates should affect long-term yields. This section 
describes my procedure for analyzing the impact of expected tax changes 
on yield spreads. 22  James M. Poterba 
2.3.1  Asset Pricing Framework 
dollar and a tax-exempt coupon Cm  will sell at par if 
(6) 
where p is the nominal after-tax discount rate applied to the bond's 
income stream. Similarly, a taxable bond selling at par must satisfy the 
condition 
In equilibrium, newly issued T-period bonds with a par value of one 
T 
1 = c  (1  + p)-jC"  + (1 + p)-T 
j=O 
1  = c.  (1 + p)-j(l  - 0f)C' + (1 + p)-7 
j=O  (7) 
where C'  is the taxable coupon and 0,.  is the expected marginal tax rate 
of the marginal holder of this bond in period j.  This tax rate could 
change over the life of the bond in either of two ways. The tax code 
might change, altering 0,  for the bond's initial owner, or the owner of 
the bond might change, as when a household purchases a long-term 
new-issue bond and sells it to a bank when its remaining maturity is 
five years.  For bonds that are sold at par,  the yield to maturity (y) 
equals the coupon rate, so y'  = C'  and ym = Cm. 
The asset  pricing equations can  be  linearized, following standard 
procedures from term-structure studies, to calculate the effect of a tax 
change on each bond's  yield to maturity. My analysis assumes that the 
discount rate, p, is unaffected by the tax change. This is an oversim- 
plification, since major reforms in either the corporate or personal tax 
system are likely to affect the after-tax return available to investors. 
The yield to maturity on a tax-exempt bond must equal p, so by as- 
sumption the tax change will have no effect on the required municipal 
coupon rate. Changes in expected tax rates will, however, affect the 
required coupon on taxable bonds selling at par. By differentiating (7), 
we find 




dy'  = xwJdO; 
j=O 
The implied tax rate computed by comparing taxable and tax-exempt 
yields at maturity T is defined to be el,,  where 
(10)  el,  = (y'T -  yy)/y+. 23  Explaining the Yield Spread 
Changes in the implied tax rate can be linked to changes in expected 
future tax rates using (9): 
where 
In the special case of a consol, the expression for do1  becomes 
which is just a discounted sum of changes in expected future tax rates. 
The change in the implied tax rate can also be written in terms of 
holding period returns on taxable and tax-exempt bonds. In the fixed 
discount rate case, the price of a taxable consol is PL  = l/yT and the 
expression for el. becomes 
Therefore the change in the implied tax rate is proportional to the return 
on the taxable consol, since 
where dPL/Pf,  is the holding period return. If  the discount rate were 
allowed to vary, del. would  be  proportional  to the difference  in  the 
holding period returns on municipal and taxable consols. 
then (1  1) 
would provide a basis for empirical investigation.  We  could estimate 
regression models of  the form 
If it were possible to obtain reliable estimates of {d0;}& 
to test whether changes in  expected personal  or corporate tax rates 
altered the yield spreads on taxable and tax- exempt bonds. Alternative 
measures of 0;  could be constructed from forecasts of the future course 
of  personal, and corporate, tax policy. Evidence that changes in ex- 24  James M. Poterba 
pected personal tax rates influenced the taxable-tax  exempt yield spread 
would contradict the bank arbitrage model and Miller Model I. 
The dependent variable in equation (16) is readily observable; it is 
the change in the implied tax rate between two periods. Unfortunately, 
the independent variable depends upon the path of  tax expectations 
over a long horizon. These are difficult, if not impossible, to measure. 
Several problems are particularly acute. First, it is necessary to dis- 
tinguish between permanent and temporary tax reforms. Transitory tax 
changes will have smaller effects on long-term yields than permanent 
changes, and it is therefore essential to specify the horizon over which 
investors expect tax reforms to persist. Second, the marginal tax rates 
that determine Wmay depend on both the tax code and the disrriburion 
of  wealth by  tax brackets.  Changes in the highest marginal personal 
tax rates, without any movement in lower bracket rates or in the dis- 
tribution  of wealth, might have no effect on the yield spread.  Fore- 
casting the distribution of wealth across tax rates is also rather difficult. 
A final problem in constructing A87 is predicting the debt-supply be- 
havior of municipal governments. A smaller yield spread between tax- 
able and  tax-exempt yields, possibly  induced by  tax  reform, might 
reduce  the  total amount of  municipal debt marketed  by  states and 
localities. In some models this could change the tax rate of the marginal 
investor. Since there is at present little evidence on how municipal debt 
supply responds to interest rates, these predictions would again be 
subject to great uncertainty. 
Rather than trying to construct a measure of czjAOj  for each month, 
this paper adopts a simpler but less powerful testing strategy. By  ex- 
amining news accounts of tax policy debates, it is possible to identify 
months when investors should have revised their expectations of future 
tax rates. These months can be  classified into those in  which there 
would have most likely been positive and negative revisions. Indicator 
variables for these months are then included in regression models for 
the movements in implied tax rates at various maturities. If  changes 
in expected future personal tax rates do affect the yield  spread, then 
these indicator variables should have significant effects and their signs 
should accord with the direction of movement in tax expectations. 
The principal empirical difficulty that  arises in  implementing this 
procedure is deciding what tax expectations were before news arrived. 
The passage of a tax bill raising interest income tax rates might increase 
expected future tax rates. However, if investors expected the increase 
in tax rates to be larger than those that were actually approved, then 
the final passage of  a higher-taxes bill might in fact reduce expected 
future tax rates. There is no easy way to resolve problems of this type, 
and the results presented below should therefore be interpreted with 
T 
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some caution. The remainder of this section describes how tax policy 
“events”  were identified and their effects on expectations assessed. It 
then discusses the econometric specification of my estimating equations. 
2.3.2 
To identify tax policy events during the last thirty years, I searched 
through the annual indexes to the New York Times and read the sections 
on Federal Income Taxation and Government Bonds. My first reading 
was confined to items that  appeared  in  boldface  type. Whenever a 
potentially  significant tax policy  announcement  was  encountered, I 
searched backward  in time to see if  previous months had contained 
similar but less highly publicized information. My search revealed nu- 
merous events that could have changed expectations of  tax rates, and 
it was necessary to make subjective judgements about which ones to 
investigate further. I pursued  those that  seemed most  important by 
examining the Congressional Quarterly  Weekly Report for each year 
to look for related events that might not have been reported in the New 
York Times. The resulting series of monthly tax events should provide 
a rough chronology of times when tax policy was expected to change. 
The set of tax events I considered most significant, along with a brief 
description of each, is reported in table 2.4. The events vary in their 
character and importance. Some are proposed IRS rulings on the tax 
treatment  of  municipal interest  payments,  others are developments 
during congressional debates, and still others are announcements of 
plans for far-reaching changes in  the tax structure. The events I con- 
sider to be of the greatest significance with respect to tax expectations 
are identified with an asterisk; they are the principal events I analyze 
in  the next section. However, further results involving all of  the tax 
events are reported in the appendix. 
The important tax events divide into five major groups: those sur- 
rounding  the  Kennedy-Johnson tax  cut; the Vietnam  War  tax  sur- 
charge; the 1969 Tax Reform Act’s proposed changes in the tax treat- 
ment of municipal interest; the Reagan tax cut; and several changes in 
the tax treatment of banks. While it is difficult to obtain information 
on the relative importance of the different tax events, a brief account 
of each is provided below. 
The  1964 tax cut had been  discussed by  officials in the Kennedy 
administration beginning in  1962 and was proposed in the 1963 State 
of the Union speech. It reduced the top marginal tax rate on individuals 
from 91% to 70%, although its effect on tax rates below the maximum 
was less dramatic. The weighted average marginal dividend tax rate 
series computed by  Estrella and Fuhrer (1983) declined by 6.5 per- 
centage points  between  1963  and  1965. The  1964  Act  also lowered 
corporate tax rates from 52% to 48%  over a two-year  period.  Both 
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Table 2.4  Tax Policy Events, 1955-84 
Predicted effect on 
implied tax rate 
Bank  Preferred 
arbitrage/  habitat/ 
Miller  Miller 
Month  Tax policy event  Model I  Model I1 
May  1959 
'May-June  1962 
September 
1962 
'January  1963 
January 1964 
February 1964 
'January  1967 
May  1968 
'June  1968 
'March  1969 





Rep. Wilbur Mills proposes to hold 
hearings to broaden the tax base. 
Treasury Secretary Dillon and 
President Kennedy advocate 
reductions in tax rates, especially 
at top rates. 
Keogh-Smathers bill signed into law 
allowing self-employed individuals 
to maintain tax-favored retirement 
plans. 
President Kennedy proposes tax 
cut in State of the Union message. 
President Johnson asks Congress 
for urgent action to pass tax-cut 
proposal. 
Tax cut passes Congress and is 
signed into law; top marginal tax 
rates reduced from 91% to 70%. 
President Johnson asks for a tax 
surcharge to stem inflation and 
finance Vietnam War. 
Surtax plan passes Congress. 
Final passage of surtax plan. 
Several members of House Ways 
and Means Committee announce 
intention of changing the taxation 
of municipal interest. 
House Ways and Means Committee 
passes minimum tax provision 
including municipal interest in tax 
base. 
Senator Russell Long and Finance 
Committee members express 
opposition to House treatment of 
tax-exempt interest in minimum tax 
provision. 
Passage of 1969 Tax Act with 
surtax extended for part of 1970. 
House Ways and Means Committee 
passes bill reducing top marginal 
tax rate on unearned income to 
50%. 
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Table 2.4  (continued) 
-  ~ 
Predicted effect on 
implied tax rate 
Bank  Preferred 
arbitrage/  habitat/ 
Miller  Miller 
Month  Tax policy event  Model I  Model I1 
January  1978 
'June  1980 
*November 
1980 
'December  1980 
'January  1981 
*February 1981 
'August  1981 
'August  1982 
Carter proposes tax reforms that 
would raise tax rates on high- 
income groups. 
candidate Reagan explains his 
30% tax reduction plan with 
across-the-board tax cuts. 
Election of Ronald Reagan raises 
the probability of major tax 
reductions. 
IRS rules that commercial banks 
may not deduct interest expenses 
on borrowing used for holding 
municipal debt. 
IRS reverses ruling on bank tax 
treatment regarding municipal 
interest. 
At a major press conference, 
Reagan proposes tax cut. 
Tax cut passes with provisions for 
IRAs, Keoghs, and All-Savers 
certificates, reduces maximum 
marginal tax rate on unearned 
income to 50%. 
TEFRA restricts access to tax- 
deferred savings vehicles, 
changes interest deduction rules 
on banks, makes municipal 
interest subject to tax for some 
Social Security recipients 





NOTE:  These tax events were identified  by scanning the pages of the New  York Times 
Index and the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Events preceded by an asterisk 
are those that were considered to be most significant in their effects on tax expectations. 
The events in December 1980, January 1981, and August 1982 have no effect under Miller 
Model I, but have the effect indicated in parentheses for the bank arbitrage model. 
Miller models as well as the bank arbitrage view therefore predict that 
these changes should have affected the relative pricing of  taxable and 
tax-exempt debt. 
President Johnson's  Vietnam War surtax was first proposed in Jan- 
uary 1967, but it did not receive congressional approval until June 1968. 28  James M. Poterba 
There was a 5% surtax on both corporate and individual income tax 
liability in  1968, a  10% surtax in  1969, and a 2.5%  surtax in  1970. I 
focus principally on the proposal of the surtax in 1967, and its effect on 
tax expectations. Okun (1971), in his study of consumption responses 
to the surtax, argues that  “influenced  in  part  by  the history  of  the 
Korean  war  ‘temporary’ taxation,  American  citizens typically  were 
skeptical that the tax surcharge would actually expire in a short time” 
(p. 178). This suggests that the surtax may have had larger effects than 
would ordinarily be associated with a three-year tax increase. Since the 
surtax altered both individual and corporate tax rates, it is again difficult 
to distinguish between the different models using this tax reform. 
The third set of tax events that impinge upon municipal bond yields 
involve the Tax Reform Act of  1969. Early in  1969, several members 
of  the House Ways and Means Committee indicated informally their 
intention of reforming the tax treatment of municipal interest payments. 
The Treasury Department proposed a plan for a minimum tax, which 
included interest on municipal bonds in the definition of income subject 
to minimum tax. The Ways and Means Committee passed legislation 
to this effect in  July, and revised tax treatment of  municipal interest 
seemed likely until September, when Senate hearings began and Sen- 
ator Russell Long and members of the Senate Finance Committee made 
their intention of preserving tax-exempt interest well known. The pop- 
ular wisdom at the time held that the escalation of municipal interest 
rates was principally due to the tax reforms. The New York Times, in 
a September 1969 article, concluded that 
some of the [increase in municipal interest rates] has been caused 
by the general tightness in the money and capital markets. . . . More 
of the increase, however,  appears to result from investor worries 
over the possibility that municipal bonds won’t carry a tax advantage 
as attractive as they do now. Tax reform legislation has significantly 
undermined the traditional method for financing state and local cap- 
ital needs. [7 September 1969, p. 111-121 
While the immediate prospect for tax reform declined after the final 
provisions of the  1969 Act became clear, there were still discussions 
of some reform plans for some time afterward. 
The 1969 reform discussion is important because it did not propose 
any changes in corporate tax rates. The minimum tax was to be applied 
to individuals, not firms, and corporate tax rates were largely unaffected 
by the Tax Reform Act.  If  the Miller Model I or the bank arbitrage 
hypothesis is correct, then there should be no change in the implied tax 
rates on municipal bonds as a result of the tax proposals. Miller Model 
I1 and the “preferred habitat” model, however, would both predict sub- 
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The next major tax change is President  Reagan’s tax cut of  1981. 
Ronald Reagan had discussed tax reform during the election campaign 
of 1980, and in a June press conference he made clear that if elected 
he would introduce across-the-board cuts in marginal personal tax rates. 
The news media at the time concluded that, regardless of the election’s 
outcome, some type of significant tax reduction would be likely. The 
final tax bill reduced the highest marginal tax rate on unearned income 
from 70% to 50% and instituted a tax reform plan that would reduce 
tax rates by 26% over three years. Two of the most important 1981 tax 
developments, from the standpoint of the municipal bond market, did 
not occur until near the time of the tax bill’s passage. These changes 
were the extension of  the  IRA  eligibility  to individuals enrolled  in 
private pension plans, and the one-year All-Savers program. The  former 
altered the long-run prospects for the attractiveness of municipal bonds 
as a source of tax sheltered income. The latter drew short-term money 
from municipal bond funds into savings institutions.  The importance 
of these events led me to focus on August  1981 in my analysis of the 
1981  tax cut.12 
The 1981  tax changes were also directed primarily at the individual 
tax rate, and they did not substantially affect the marginal tax rates 
facing firms.  Both the bank  arbitrage  model and the Miller Model I 
would predict no effects from the 1981 reforms, while the Miller Model 
I1 and the preferred habitat model would predict substantial  movements 
in implied tax rates. 
The final set of tax events concerns the tax treatment of banks. The 
first occurred in December 1980, when the IRS issued Revenue Pro- 
cedure 80-55,  which stated that banks would henceforth be unable to 
deduct interest paid on governmental time deposits that were collater- 
alized by tax-exempt securities. If implemented, this rule would have 
substantially reduced the attractiveness of holding municipal debt for 
commercial banks (see Madeo and Pincus 1983). The rule was subse- 
quently reversed in January 1981 after the Reagan administration took 
office. These two months should be characterized by changes in short- 
term yield spreads under all views, and long-term responses under the 
preferred  habitat  model and  the bank  arbitrage  hypothesis. In both 
Miller models, corporate financial adjustments determine the equilib- 
rium pattern of bond prices, so the tax treatment of banks is irrelevant. 
A less important event affecting the attractiveness of bank participation 
in the municipal market occurred with the passage of TEFRA in 1982, 
when  banks were  restricted  to deducting only 85%  of their interest 
payments on borrowing used to hold municipal bonds. 
Determining the magnitude and direction of expectational changes 
is not the only problem with an “event”  study of this type. We  also 
must measure when expectations changed. The equations reported in 30  James M. Poterba 
the next section all assume that expectations change during the month 
I  have  labeled  as the  “tax  event.”  An  alternative  approach  would 
recognize that in many cases information builds gradually over time. 
This could be implemented by defining indicator variables for the month 
labeled as the tax  event and either the month before  or the month 
afterward. I experimented with these different approaches, and found 
that the qualitative character of my  results was unaffected by them. 
2.3.3  Econometric Specification 
Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 have described how tax events affect the 
municipal  yield  spread.  However,  to provide  reliable  evidence  on 
whether or not tax changes affect municipal yields, we must control 
for a variety of other factors that also induce movements in the yield 
spread. The relative riskiness of  taxable and tax-exempt debt is the 
most important such factor. 
Two techniques are used in controlling for changing risk. First, just 
as in the case of tax policy events, the New  York  Times Index was 
scanned for evidence of important events that would have affected the 
perceived riskiness of municipal securities. These events, which are 
detailed in  table 2.5,  included the New York  City financial crisis of 
1974-75 and the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. For each risk event, 
an indicator variable was defined and included in the regression for 
changes in the implied tax rates. Increases in municipal riskiness should 
reduce O’,  since higher tax-exempt interest rates would be demanded 
by investors. Many of the risk events proved insignificant when added 
to the regression equations, and they are not reported in the tables in 
the next section. 
The relative riskiness of municipal securities also depends on other 
factors such as the economy’s position in the business cycle and the 
share of  state and local revenues provided  through federal revenue 
sharing. The change in the unemployment rate, AUNEMPR, and the 
change in  the share of federal grants in state and local expenditures, 
AFEDGRANT, were therefore included in some specifications. To al- 
low for any systematic changes in the composition or riskiness of tax- 
exempt debt issued at different moments in the calendar year, I also 
included a set of monthly dummy variables in the regression equations. 
January was the only month that ever showed a substantial or signif- 
icant coefficient, and since there are other anomalies of security be- 
havior that  are known  to occur in  January,  I retained the January 
variable  but  left  all  other  monthly  variables  out  of  the  final 
specifications.  l3 
The equations in the next section also include two other variables. 
The first, ASLSHARE, is the change in the fraction of total outstanding 
credit market debt that is accounted for by state and local obligations. 31  Explaining the Yield Spread 
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Tnble 2.5  Events Affecting Municipal Bond Risk 
Month  Risk event 
Predicted effect on 











President Nixon announces plan for 
revenue sharing in State of Union 
address.  + 
Expansion of size of proposed 
revenue-sharing plans 
(REVSHARE).  + 
House Ways and Means Committee 
approves revenue-sharing bill.  + 
First indications of financial distress 
by New York City (NYCl). 
Height of New York City financial 
crisis (NYC2).  - 
Passage of Proposition 13 in 
California.  - 
Rising concern over impact of 
WPPSS default and Washington 
State Supreme Court ruling 
absolving utilities of liability 
(WPPSS).  - 
- 
NOTE:  These events were identified by examining the New York  Times Index sections 
for government bonds. A more complete discussion of the two New York events may 
be found in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1976) and Hoffland 
(1977). The names in parentheses are used to describe these variables in  subsequent 
tables that report regression results. 
In Miller Model I and the bank arbitrage model, the quantity of state 
and local debt outstanding should have no impact on the implied tax 
rate, because offsetting changes should occur in corporate capital struc- 
tures. In Miller Model I1 and the preferred habitat model, there could 
be an effect on the implied tax rate. The variable ASLSHARE is in- 
cluded as a test of these predictions. 
The final variable I include is A(VOLATILITY), the change in an 
estimate of interest rate volatility. This is measured as the change in a 
thirty-six-month rolling estimate of the variance of tax-exempt interest 
rates at the maturity of the implied tax rate. It is designed to capture 
the changing value of the “tax trading”  options on taxable and tax- 
exempt bonds. 
The basic equation which I estimated  for one-, five-, ten-, and twenty- 
year maturity bonds is: 
A8{  = Po + P,AUNEMPR, + P,AFEDGRANT, 
+ 2  GjRISKj,  + 2  ?,TAXk,  + E, 
(17)  + P,ASLSHARE,  + P,A(VOLATILITY),  + PsJANUARY 32  James M. Poterba 
The set of variables RISK,,  are indicator variables for risk events, and 
TAXk,  are indicators for tax policy changes. 
Before considering the results, two estimation issues should be men- 
tioned. First, the data on yields to maturity are sometimes subject to 
errors of measurement. Salomon Brothers estimates the yield that would 
be required on a T year bond selling at par. The estimates are based 
on a yield curve calculated  from actual bond  sales. For municipals, 
which are typically sold in blocks including bonds of varying maturities, 
the yield curve may give slightly erroneous estimates for some yields. 
Since the dependent variable in (1  7) depends on the difference in yields 
in two consecutive months, errors in the yield data will induce a moving 
average error. The reported equations were all  corrected for MA(1) 
errors using a maximum-likelihood procedure. 
Second, the residuals from OLS estimation of (17) were clearly het- 
eroscedastic over time. To allow for changing error variances, the sam- 
ple was divided into twelve subsamples of  equal length, twenty-nine 
months, and the error variance was assumed to be constant within each 
of  these months but allowed to vary between them. The White Test 
reported in each column of  the tables is a test (White  1980) against 
heteroscedasticity of this form; it always allows us to reject the null 
of homoscedasticity.  The reported equations were estimated using a 
feasible GLS procedure.14 
2.4  Regression Results 
This section reports the results of analyzing the movements in implied 
tax rates for short- and long-term bonds during the months of major 
tax policy changes. Table 2.6a reports results for bonds with maturities 
of ten and twenty years. Results for one-year bonds are reported in 
table 2.6b. This section first analyzes which tax events appear to have 
affected the bond market substantially, and then returns to the question 
of which equilibrium model these results support. The tax policy events 
are discussed in chronological order, focusing on those events that were 
marked with an asterisk in table 2.4. Full sets of regression results for 
all tax and risk events are reported in the appendix. 
2.4.1  Tax Policy Events 
The initial discussions of a tax cut in 1962 seem to have induced little 
movement  in  the taxable-tax  exempt yield  spread. When  President 
Kennedy asked for the tax cut in his  State of the Union address in 
January  1963, however, there was a coincident decline in the implied 
long-term marginal tax rate of nearly four percentage points. This is 
evident in the implied tax rates  on ten- and twenty-year bonds.  By 
comparison,  the  yields on one-year bonds  hardly  responded  to the Table 2.6a  Changes in Implicit Tax Rates on Long-Maturity Bonds 
Twenty-year maturity  Ten-year maturity 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3 
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-5.90 Table 2.6a  (continued) 
Twenty-year maturity  Ten-year maturity 
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NOTE:  All equations are estimated for the period 1955:  I -  1983: 12, a total of 348 monthly observations. 
Equations are  estimated allowing for a first-order moving average error structure,  with MA parameter 
8,  with a correction for heteroscedasticity.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 35  Explaining the Yield Spread 
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Table 2.6b  Changes in Implicit Tax  Rates on One-Year Bonds 
Variable  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant 
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Table 2.6b  (continued) 
































NOTE:  All equations are estimated for the period 1955:l-1983:12,  a total of 348 monthly 
observations. Equations are estimated allowing for a first-order moving average error 
structure, with MA parameter 0, with a correction for heteroscedasticity. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
proposed tax cut; the implied tax rate on one-year bonds changed by 
less than one percentage point. This suggests that the market reacted 
to changing expectations about the long-run course of tax policy, but 
recognized that because of implementation lags, reforms were not likely 
to occur immediately. The magnitude of  the implied tax rate change, 
four percentage points, is close to the proposed change in  corporate 
tax rates and somewhat smaller than the change in measures of personal 
tax burden such as weighted average dividend or interest income tax 
rates. Since the tax bill proposed by President Kennedy reduced both 
personal and corporate tax rates, all of the equilibrium models proposed 
in section 2.2 predict movements in implied tax rates. The finding that 
bond prices adjusted supports the notion that tax expectations affect 
the yield spread, but does not help distinguish between the competing 
views. 
The bond price effects of the initial announcement of President John- 
son’s surtax plan are also pronounced.  In January  1967  the implied 
long-term tax  rate  rose by  over 4%.  This coefficient is statistically 
significant at all standard levels. President Johnson’s proposed surtax, 
in spite of its explicitly temporary nature, had as large an impact on 
the yield spread as the announced 1963-64  tax cut; this is somewhat 
puzzling. It may suggest that taxpayers perceived the far-reaching Ken- 
nedy reforms to be no more than a transitory event, or that they sus- 
pected that the surtax might last for a long while. The short-term mu- 
nicipal market also reacted to the tax-cut plan, again by  “too much” 
to be explained by tax expectations alone. The implied tax rate on one- 
year bonds rose by more than ten percentage points in January 1967. 37  Explaining the Yield Spread 
This may reflect the expectation of bondholders that a large tax increase 
would be enacted swiftly, as part of an emergency war finance program. 
Even if it were expected to pass immediately, however, the magnitude 
of the short-term yield effect is larger than can plausibly be attributed 
to taxes alone. Like the  1964 change, the  1967 reform affected both 
personal and corporate tax rates and it therefore has little power to 
distinguish  between  the  different  models  of  municipal  yield 
determination. 
The tax reform discussions of 1969 provide more convincing evidence 
that personal tax changes affect yield spreads in the tax-exempt bond 
market. The initial proposals for changing the tax status of municipal 
interest, in March  1969, coincided with sharp declines in the impIied 
tax rates in all markets. The tax rate computed from twenty-year bonds 
fell by 4.5 percentage points, while that on ten-year bonds fell by 3%. 
Short bonds also responded dramatically, with the tax rate changing 
by almost six percentage points.I5 The subsequent action by the Ways 
and Means Committee in July  1969 had  a pronounced effect on the 
long-term market, inducing between five- and seven- point reductions 
in the long-term implied tax rate, but had virtually no impact on one- 
year implied tax rates. In the short- term market, the implied tax rate 
actually rose by two percentage points during that month. The turn- 
about in expectations that occurred in September 1969 once again caused 
dramatic effects in the long-term bond market but only small move- 
ments in short-term yields. The implied tax rate on twenty-year mu- 
nicipal bonds rose by twelve percentage points in September; that on 
ten-year securities jumped nearly 10%. By comparison, short-term im- 
plied tax rates rose by only 4%. 
Unlike the previous tax events, the 1969 legislative developments can 
help to resolve the differences between the competing models of mu- 
nicipal market equilibrium. All  of the proposals to implement a mini- 
mum tax focused only on changing the personal tax code. In both the 
bank arbitrage model and Miller Model I, these proposals should have 
had no effect on the relative yields on taxable and tax-exempt debt. The 
finding of major changes in long-term yields coincident with these tax 
developments suggests that Miller Model I1 or the preferred habitat model 
may provide a better explanation of long-term yield determination than 
either of the models that focuses on the corporate tax rate. 
The fourth major tax reform, the Reagan tax cut of  1980-81,  also 
seems to have  affected  the  yield  spread  between  taxable  and  tax- 
exempt debt. However, relatively few of  the events I identified prior 
to the passage of ERTA in 1981  had substantial effects. In June 1980, 
for example, when candidate Reagan announced his tax-reform plans 
at a press conference, the implied tax rate on twenty-year municipal 
bonds declined  by  nearly  four percentage points.  This could  be  at- 38  James M. Poterba 
tributed to tax expectations;  however,  this explanation is weakened 
by  the finding that ten-year implied tax rates hardly declined during 
that month. Similarly, the effect of  Reagan's electoral victory in  No- 
vember  1980  is  weak.  The  signs  of  the  coefficients  on  long-term 
implied tax rates are mixed, and none of  the coefficients is close to 
statistically significant. The Reagan budget proposal in February 198 1 
evoked a similarly small response from the long-term bond  market; 
most of the estimated coefficients are positive, not negative, as would 
be predicted by either of the models that focuses on personal taxes. 
These insignificant results during three periods when tax expectations 
may  have  changed  constitute  some  support  for  the bank  arbitrage 
model and Miller Model I. Alternatively, they  may  show that bond 
market participants considered passage of a tax reform plan unlikely 
until President Reagan's  stunning victory in the House at the end of 
July  1981. 
Support for the importance of personal tax variables comes from the 
coefficients on the August 1981 indicator for the passage of ERTA. All 
of  the long-term implied tax rates decline substantially, with twenty- 
year bonds showing a drop of  six percentage points in the value of 8'. 
Smaller but statistically  significant effects are recorded on the other 
long-term implied tax rates. Like the 1969 discussions of minimum tax, 
most of the provisions of  the 1981  bill were directed at personal, not 
corporate, tax reform. The bill cut the top marginal tax rate on unearned 
income from 70 to 50% and also extended access to tax-exempt saving 
vehicles.  The finding that  municipal bond  yields changed therefore 
provides some evidence for Miller Model I1 and the preferred habitat 
view.  Short-term yields also rose  substantially  during August  198 1, 
reducing the implied tax rate. This was probably due to the introduction 
of one-year All-Savers certificates, which drew funds away from com- 
mercial banks and money market mutual funds and into savings and 
loan  institutions. This reduced  commercial  banks'  demand  for tax- 
exempt bonds. 
The final tax events concern the tax treatment  of  banks. The tax 
event in December 1980 is the proposed IRS ruling to disallow interest 
deductions for bank loans that were collateralized with municipal se- 
curities. Under the bank arbitrage hypothesis, this development should 
have substantially lowered the implied tax rate in both long and short- 
term markets,  since it  ended the attractiveness  of  this form of tax- 
exempt income for many banks. Under both Miller models this change 
should have had no effect, and under the preferred habitat model, the 
change should have affected only short-term yields. The evidence sug- 
gests a pronounced effect on the one-year implied tax rate, a change 
of between six and seven percentage points, as well as small but sta- 
tistically less significant effects on longer-term implied tax rates. When 39  Explaining the Yield Spread 
the change was rescinded  in January  1981, however, only the short- 
term yield  spread responded in any significant fashion. This suggests 
that bank participation  in  the municipal market is a more significant 
force in setting short- than long-term bond prices. 
The evidence from the passage of TEFRA in August  1982, while 
more difficult to interpret, also suggests a role for banks. The 1982 law 
reduced  the share of  interest payments that  banks could deduct on 
loans used to hold municipal bonds from  100% to 85%, lowering the 
attractiveness  of  holding  municipal debt. Coincident  with the law’s 
passage is a widening of  the yield  spread between  taxable and tax- 
exempt debt. The difficulty in interpretation arises because the law also 
instituted other changes that might have affected non-bank  investors’ 
demand for municipals. The law effectively taxed some Social Security 
recipients on municipal interest and placed restrictions on future issues 
of  Industrial  Revenue Bonds.  This  could  have  raised  the expected 
future marginal tax rate on municipal interest and thereby raised the 
implied tax rate calculated on long-term bonds. These developments 
seem to support the importance of banks, especially at short maturities, 
in determining the yield spread. 
The results in this section are summarized in table 2.7. They do not 
provide universal support for any single theory of  how municipal in- 
terest rates are determined. However, the evidence from the 1969 Tax 
Reform hearings and the passage of ERTA in 198 1 supports either Miller 
Model I1 or the preferred habitat hypothesis at long maturities.  The 
absence of strong reactions to events during the 1980 election campaign 
and the subsequent introduction of the tax bill support the two views 
that regard personal taxes as irrelevant. The dramatic reaction in De- 
cember 1980 to the changed IRS ruling on commercial bank deducta- 
bility of taxable interest payments, especially at short maturities, sup- 
ports the bank arbitrage and preferred  habitat  views.  The preferred 
habitat model therefore receives the most widespread  support in the 
data.  l6 
The results on tax changes and long-term yield spreads can provide 
some information on the source of recent changes in the yield spread 
between taxable and tax-free securities. The implied tax rate on long- 
term bonds declined by over twenty percentage points between  1980 
and 1982. Adding up the five coefficients on the tax events during the 
1980-81  period suggests a total tax-related effect of  about eight per- 
centage points, between one-third and one-half of the total. This cal- 
culation is based  on twenty-year bonds; analysis of  ten-year bonds 
suggests that 24.5% of the decline may be attributable to taxes. These 
estimates are probably lower bounds for the true effect of  taxes on 
yield spreads, since they neglect all of the changes that may have taken 
place between my  “event  months.” Nonetheless, they suggest a sig- 40  James M. Poterba 
Table 2.7  Summary of Empirical Findings 
Predictions of  Model for Implied Tax Rate: 
Bank  Preferred 
Arbitrage  Miller  Miller  Habitat 
Tax Change  Model  Model I  Model I1  Model  Observed 
1962-63  tax cut 
proposal 
V  V  0 
V  V 
-short  term  V  V 
-long  term  V  f  f 
4 
4 
-short  term  4  a  4  4 
-long  term  4  a  a  a 
-short  term  0  0  V  0  V 
-long  term  0  0  0  f  V 
-short  term  ?  ?  V  ?  V 
-long  term  0  0  v  v  f 
v  V 
0  + 
-short  term  v  f  v 
f  v 
196718 surtax 
1969 tax act 
hearings 
1981 tax cut 
Changes in 
bank taxation 
-long  term  f 
SOURCE:  Results reported  in tables 2.6a and 2.6b and discussed in the text. 
nificant influence of tax policy on the relative yields on taxable and 
tax-exempt debt. 
Before examining the results for other variables included in the spec- 
ifications, two important caveats  should  be  noted.  First,  my  event 
variables may have dated incorrectly the points at which expectations 
of  market  participants changed. This should bias my results on tax 
policy effects toward zero. Secondly, however, the low power of  the 
event-study approach and its susceptibility to spurious factors must be 
emphasized. I have surely not controlled for all of the nontax influences 
on the tax-exempt bond market, and the results should therefore be 
interpreted with some caution. 
2.4.2  Other Explanatory Factors 
Adding variables designed to measure changes in relative riskiness 
over time, such as the change in the unemployment rate, did not change 
the conclusions about tax policy at all. The estimated coefficients for 
the tax event months change slightly between the three different spec- 
ifications that are reported for each maturity in tables 2.6a and 2.6b, 41  Explaining the Yield Spread 
but they always suggest the same conclusions. The coefficients on the 
change in the unemployment  rate indicate that an increase in unem- 
ployment reduces the implied tax rate on long-term bonds. If the un- 
employment  rate rose by  one percentage point  during a  one-month 
period,  this  would induce  between a one- and  two-percentage-point 
reduction on the implied tax rate for long-term bonds. This is consistent 
with the standard notion that Treasury securities are riskless but that 
the perceived  default probability on municipal  bonds, even highest- 
grade municipals, rises during economic downturns. This effect seems 
unimportant  for  short-maturity  debt,  where  the  coefficient  on 
AUNEMPR is positive but statistically insignificant. The other variable 
that controls for risk, the share of state and local revenues financed 
through federal grants, proved insignificant in all of the estimated equa- 
tions. Experiments with other risk measures, such as the yield spread 
between  BAA and  AAA corporate bonds or good- and  prime-rated 
municipals, produced similarly insignificant results. 
The indicator  variables designed to measure risk events generally 
had their predicted signs, but most were statistically insignificant. The 
variable  for the expansion of  revenue sharing suggested  a  one-per- 
centage-point reduction in  the implied tax rate because of risk reduc- 
tion. Both of the New York City indicator variables have statistically 
insignificant effects; this is not surprising given Hoffland’s (1977) report 
that most of the municipal market jitters engendered by the New York 
City crisis affected state and local bonds in lower rating classes. The 
WPPSS default in early 1983 also had some effect on the implied yield 
spread, inducing a large (two-point) but  statistically  insignificant re- 
duction in  the implied  tax rate. Again, this  is not  unexpected since 
most of the effect of the WPPSS default was on revenue bonds, not 
the general obligation securities used to construct my implied tax rates. 
The volatility variable that was included to capture changes in tax- 
timing values had a negative sign in all of the estimated equations. The 
hypothesis that it has no effect is often impossible to reject, however, 
and the pattern of coefficients across different maturities is also sur- 
prising. The volatility effect through the tax-timing option  should be 
smallest for short-maturity bonds, but the coefficient on the volatility 
variable  is larger for short- than for long-maturity implied tax rates. 
Large standard errors make inferences about these coefficients difficult, 
however. 
The final variable  I  included,  the ‘‘supply effect”  measure of the 
share of state and local debt in the outstanding stock of credit market 
debt, has a significant or nearly significant negative coefficient in nearly 
all of the estimated equations. This suggests that increases in the out- 
standing stock of municipals  will lower the implied tax rate between 
taxable and tax-exempt bonds, providing strong evidence against both 42  James M. Poterba 
the bank arbitrage model and Miller Model I, both of which predict 
the irrelevance  of relative supplies. A one-percentage-point  increase 
in the quantity of municipal debt would be predicted to reduce implied 
tax rate on twenty-year bonds by approximately 4.7 percentage points. 
The estimated  effects of the same change for other maturities  vary 
between three and seven percentage points. These results are consis- 
tent with the preferred habitat model and Miller Model 11, both of which 
allow changes in the stock of municipal debt to change the tax rate of 
the marginal holder of municipal bonds. Unfortunately, the lack of data 
on the outstanding  stock of debt at different maturities precluded testing 
more precise hypotheses, such as whether larger issues of short-term 
debt depress the short-term implied tax rate. 
2.5  Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence that the yield spreads between long- 
term taxable  and tax-exempt  bonds respond to changes in expected 
future tax rates. The finding  that changes in  expected tax rates on 
individual investors alter the yield spread casts doubt on some of the 
theories of municipal bond pricing that have been advanced in recent 
years. It supports the conclusion  that the municipal  market is  seg- 
mented, with different investor clienteles at short and long maturities. 
These results shed some light on the likely effects of two proposed 
changes in  municipal  borrowing practices. The first reform calls for 
increased state and local use of short-term borrowing with a concom- 
mitant reduction in long-term bond issues.  l7 This proposal is motivated 
by the upward-sloping nominal term structure of tax-exempt interest 
rates.  In 1983, for example, the average yield on one-year prime mu- 
nicipal bonds was only 60% of that on twenty-year bonds. Short-term 
tax-exempt rates were also lower relative to comparable taxable rates. 
In spite of this interest rate differential, only 31%  of municipal bor- 
rowing in  1983 was at maturities of less than one year, and less than 
6% of the outstanding stock of state and local debt was short-term. 
The potential savings from increased short-term borrowing depend 
crucially  upon the causes of the recent increase in, and generally el- 
evated level of, long-term tax-exempt interest rates. If long-term yields 
are high because of risk, which would be the explanation of the upward- 
sloping  term structure in  either the bank  arbitrage  model or  Miller 
Model I, then heavier use of short-term debt would yield little reduction 
in  borrowing  costs over the life  of  state and local capital  projects. 
However, the preferred habitat theory suggests that some savings might 
occur. If yield differentials are due partly to different tax rates facing 
investors in different market segments, then increased short-term bor- 
rowing could reduce borrowing costs. The findings in this paper provide 43  Explaining the Yield Spread 
some support for this view. Further research is needed to disentangle 
the contributions of risk, tax expectations,  and other factors to the 
shape of the tax-exempt term structure, and to provide estimates of 
the expected savings from increased short-term borrowing. 
A second reform proposal is the so- called taxable bond option, which 
would  allow states and localities the option of  issuing taxable debt 
while receiving a subsidy, equal to a fixed fraction of the bond issue, 
from the federal government.I8 Fama (1977) argued that this proposal 
would not be successful unless the subsidy rate equaled the corporate 
tax rate, since all deviations from RM = (1 -  T)R  are due to risk. The 
results in this paper, however, cast doubt on this conclusion. In either 
a preferred  habitat  or Miller Model I1 scenario, states and localities 
might choose to issue taxable debt at subsidy rates substantially below 
the corporate tax rate. Unfortunately, the estimates here do not provide 
direct measures of the required subsidy level. 
These results also inform the debate on corporate capital structure 
and what determines debt-equity ratios. Evidence on the relative prices 
of taxable and tax-exempt  debt contradicts the frequent assumption 
that the effective tax rate on equity income equals zero. In the capital 
structure model advanced by Merton Miller (1977), nonzero equity tax 
rates imply that few investors will choose to hold equity rather than 
corporate debt.  l9  The observation that corporate capital structures are 
75% equity is therefore difficult to explain in this framework. 
This paper raises several important questions for future studies of 
municipal finance. First, the municipal debt supply decision has been 
left unspecified throughout  this analysis. Little is known about how 
municipal finance officers choose between  issuing debt  of  different 
maturities. Second, I have discussed plans to change real borrowing 
costs for states and localities without addressing the normative question 
of whether such a reduction should be a goal of public policy.2o  States’ 
and  localities’ capital expenditures  are twice  subsidized  relative  to 
private  capital, through both tax-exempt  finance and the income-tax 
deductability of  property taxes. However, many of  the benefits from 
provision of  public capital, such as schools or roads, accrue to indi- 
viduals outside the jurisdiction that provides them. The optimal degree 
of  subsidy vis-a-vis private capital may therefore be greater than, or 
less than, that currently provided. Finally, the evidence presented here 
suggests that  some of  the current proposals to  reform municipal  fi- 
nancing policies could affect the real cost of  public borrowing.  Nu- 
merical estimates of these effects are still needed. 44  James M. Poterba 
Table 2A.1  Regression Results Including All Tax Events 
Maturity class 
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Table 2A.1  (continued) 
~  ~~~~ 
Maturity class 
Variables  Twenty years  Ten years  Five years  One year 
NYC2  -3.67  2.68  0.70  1.30 
(2.69)  (2.56)  (2.76)  (4.14) 
(1.79)  (1.45)  (1.69)  (2.90) 
(1.74)  (1.37)  (1.61)  (2.82) 
(1.90)  (2.20)  (2.55)  (2.78) 
Jan. 78  -0.91  -2.68  -3.06  -  2.66 
June 78  0.30  -0.13  -0.17  2.12 
June 80  -4.07  0.01  0.77  -  3.66 
Nov. 80  0.14  -0.14  0.04  0.21 
Dec. 80  -  3.58  -2.96  -4.31  -5.55 
Jan. 81  1.57  1.04  1.07  3.12 
Feb. 81  0.60  0.48  0.48  2.10 
Aug. 81  -6.58  -  6.29  -4.80  -  6.43 
(1.90)  (2.20)  (2.55)  (2.78) 
(1.90)  (2.20)  (2.55)  (2.78) 
(1.95)  (2.25)  (2.60)  (2.86) 
(1.90)  (2.20)  (2.55)  (2.78) 
(3.36)  (2.59)  (2.78)  (3.14) 
(3.36)  (2.59)  (2.78)  (3.14) 
(1.94)  (1  SO)  (1.61)  (1.82) 
(0.48)  (0.50)  (0.56)  (0.71) 
Aug. 82  3.78  4.18  6.0.5  4.19 
WPPSS  -0.92  -  1.40  -2.17  -  2.10 
JANUARY  2.21  2.30  2.12  0.21 
0 
R2 
0.34  0.40  0.49  0.39 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.0.5) 
0.23  0.20  0.17  0.16 
D.W.  2.00  2.00  1.95  1.89 
SEE  1  .oo  0.98  0.96  1  .oo 
White Test  33.44  40.59  43.71  54.94 
NOTE:  All equations are estimated for the period 1955:l-1983:12,  a total of 348 monthly 
observations. Equations are estimated allowing for a first-order moving average error 
structure, with MA parameter 0, with a correction for heteroscedasticity. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Equations reported here correspond to those in Model I of 
tables 2.6a  and 2.6b  in the text. 46  James M. Poterba 
Notes 
1.  Arak and Guentner (1983) discuss several of these explanations. 
2.  Other recent studies such as Trczinka (1982) and Kidwell and Trczinka (1982) have 
compared the yields on prime municipals with  AAA-rated corporate bonds. However, 
their corporate bond data are only available since 1970, and that would eliminate many 
interesting tax changes from the sample period. The corporate-municipal yield spread 
is also more sensitive to varying risk differentials than the yield spread between Treasury 
bonds and municipals. 
3.  Schaefer (1977) discusses several problems associated with  yields to maturity in 
situations when the return on a bond is not proportional to its coupon payment. 
4. Reference to tables 5 and 9 in Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984) suggests that 
changes in coupon rates and interest rate volat  es, while they can substantially alter 
the value of the tax timing option, do not lead to large changes in the relative values of 
the options on taxable and tax-exempt bonds. 
debt of more than 1% per year. This is inconsistent with the history of municipal defaults, 
reported for example in ACIR (1976). The annual default probability on a prime municipal 
would have to have risen by almost 2% between 1980 and 1982 to explain the narrowing 
taxable-tax  exempt yield spread. A newly issued twenty-year bond would therefore have 
had at least a 35% chance of defaulting during its lifetime; this seems implausibly large. 
6. A discussion of commercial bank behavior may be found in Proctor and Donahoo 
( 1983). 
7. My discussion of municipal debt in the Miller Model draws heavily on Auerbach 
and King (1983) and McDonald (1983). A related discussion may be found in Buser and 
Hess (1984). 
8. The figure assumes that T,  = ym, for some y. This would  be the case if  capital 
gains were untaxed,  dividends were taxed at the interest tax rate, and y were the dividend- 
payout ratio. Auerbach and King (1983) present a figure similar to my figure 2.1 ;  an error 
in their diagram relating to the intersection of the tax-exempt and corporate  equity return 
lines is corrected in my figure. 
9. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Buser and Hess (1984) discuss the agency and 
contracting costs associated with different financial choices. 
10.  Data on the fraction of tax-exempt borrowing at different maturities was obtained 
from the “Decade of Municipal Financing”  tables published periodically in the Weekly 
Bond Buyer. 
11.  When the discount rate is allowed to change, the conclusion that municipal bond 
prices remain constant in the face of a tax change would no longer follow. If there were 
a fixed world pretax interest rate and the discount rate equaled (1 - m)  times this rate, 
then taxable bond prices would be unaffected by tax changes and municipal bond prices 
would adjust. 
12.  The passage of Reagan’s tax bill  in the House occurred on July 29, 1981. Since 
the bond  market  would  not  have reacted  to this  news until the thirtieth, and since 
the Salomon Brothers data would be for yields reported on the first of August (i.e., 
trades from the thirty-first), there is a substantial risk that the information associated 
with the tax cut is not included in  the recorded August  1  yield.  That is  why I focus 
on the August event for ERTA; that is also the month during which actual passage 
occurred. 
13.  The “January  effect”  in the municipal bond market causes an increase in the 
implied tax rate; this would  correspond to a decline in the relative price of municipal 
bonds. 
14.  The GLS procedure was implemented by estimating separate residual variances 
for each twenty-nine-month period, using the homoscedastic OLS residuals, and then 
dividing each observation by the square root of the estimated variance for its data period. 
15. The pronounced effect of  the personal tax change in the short-term market may 
be due to the binding  nature of Regulation Q during  1969. Skelton (1983) argues that 
during periods when Regulation Q was binding, banks were not the marginal investors 
in the short-term municipal market. 
5. Yawitz, Maloney, and Ederington (1985) estimate default probab 47  Explaining the Yield Spread 
16.  Campbell (1980) argues against the segmentation view by claiming that bank be- 
havior is uncorrelated with the municipal-taxable yield spread. However, he ignores the 
simultaneous determination of prices and quantities: under the pure Miller model, the 
yield  spread would  not vary but bank  behavior would  change often, leading to zero 
correlation! 
17. This proposal for short-term borrowing and several related plans are described in 
Beek (1982). 
18.  A summary of arguments for and against the taxable bond option, along with much 
discussion, may be found in Mussa and Kormendi (1979). 
19. The principal difficulty with the Miller model is that explaining the large outstand- 
ing stock of corporate equity is difficult when only investors for whom (1 -  T)(I -  T~) 
z  (1 - m)  should hold equity. With T  = .46 and rn reaching its maximum at SO, only 
very low tax rates on equity are consistent with equity holding. 
20.  Gordon and  Slemrod (1983) discuss some of the issues concerning the size of 
public capital stock, and assess the distributional effects of changing the tax exemption 
of municipal bonds. 
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Comment  Douglas Holtz-Eakin 
The major question addressed by Poterba’s paper is: Can we explain 
recent declines in the taxable versus tax-exempt yield  spread by ap- 
pealing to anticipated reductions in tax rates? The coincidence of Rea- 
gan’s election  and tax cut with a  substantial  narrowing of the yield 
spread is a strong temptation for the casual empiricist in us all. Further, 
this is an important issue from a number of perspectives. For the local 
public finance specialist, it addresses the efficacy of programs to reduce 
borrowing costs by substituting short-term for long-term debt. For the 
profession as a whole, it is another investigation of the importance of 
expectational effects; effects important  to the conduct of macroeco- 
nomic policy, the design of efficient taxes over time, and numerous 
other issues. 
To  investigate  this  issue is, at least  in  principle,  straightforward. 
“All”  one need do is specify the economic actors determining demand 
and supply for tax-exempt debt of different maturities, formulate the 
mapping from past history to their expectations, and specify the rel- 
evant list  of exogenous or predetermined  variables.  After  repeating 
these steps for the markets of other assets (federal debt, corporate 
debt, equity), the researcher estimates the various supply-and-demand 
schedules and compares the predicted  and observed changes in  the 
yield differential. Unfortunately, this is as infeasible as it is appealing. 
Alternatively, one may consult the relevant theoretical work for pre- 
dictions concerning the determinants of equilibrium in the market for 
tax-exempt debt. The empirical counterpart is a reduced-form equation 
linking the yield differential with a list of relevant variables and some 
measure of expectations. The author follows this latter strategy, the 
price of which is a less powerful methodology. 
The empirical work attempts to discriminate among four alternative 
hypotheses about the determinants of tax-exempt bond yields at vary- 
ing maturities. The four theories are: the bank arbitrage model, Miller 
Model  I, Miller  Model  11,  and  the preferred habitat  model  and  are 
clearly presented in section 2.2, The main implications of the models 
are easily summarized. 
Under the bank arbitrage model, short-term and long-term bond yields 
are determined  by the arbitrage activities of banks. As a result, the 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin is assistant professor in  the  Department  of Economics at Co- 
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yield spread depends only upon the corporate tax rate. Movements in 
the yield curve are the result of expected future changes in the corporate 
tax rate. Changes in either the personal tax rates or the supply of tax- 
exempt debt do not affect the yield spread. It is this prediction that is 
most strongly rejected by the data. 
Miller Model I reaches the same conclusions as the bank arbitrage 
model, but instead because of the debt and equity supply decisions of 
corporations. Accordingly, it also is treated poorly by the data. 
Miller Model I1 assumes that individuals are unable to circumvent 
taxes on equity income. As a result, the corporate  tax rate, the personal 
tax code, and the tax-exempt debt supply all influence the equilibrium 
yield spread. 
The final hypothesis, the preferred habitat model, combines the pre- 
dictions of the previous models. In this view, commercial banks dom- 
inate the short-term market, but at longer maturities individual inves- 
tors are the dominant source of demand. Just as in the bank arbitrage 
model, neither the personal tax code nor the tax-exempt debt supply 
affects the equilibrium short-term yield  spread. At longer maturities, 
the yield spread is determined by the tax rate of the marginal investor 
in  tax-exempt bonds. As a result, the yield  spread depends directly 
upon the personal tax code and the municipal debt supply. The latter 
effect  comes from the necessity  of attracting investors in  lower tax 
brackets to hold increases in debt. 
What are the implications for municipal borrowing costs? If yields 
are determined either by the bank arbitrage or  miller I models, changes 
in the slope of the yield curve reflect expected reductions in the cor- 
porate tax rate. In these circumstances any movement to substitute 
short-term finance for longer-maturity bonds will be undone by higher 
refinancing costs in the future. Alternatively, if  the slope reflects dif- 
fering tax rates of clienteles in a segmented market, then real borrowing 
costs may be reduced by this substitution. 
What are the answers? To find out, the author tests whether changes 
in observed yield spreads or implicit tax rates are correlated with “tax 
policy events” likely to affect expectations of future personal or cor- 
porate tax rates. In doing so, he minimizes the importance of biases 
in the levels of implicit tax rates by focusing on the changes in the 
implicit  tax rate.  While  this  may  reduce confounding  expectational 
effects with either changes in differential risk or tax trading effects, it 
remains susceptible to changes in the after-tax discount rate. A more 
troubling drawback  is  the (unavoidable) use of dummy variables  to 
proxy changes in the future stream of tax rates (see equation (1 I)).  As 
such, they inevitably introduce a form of measurement error into the 
analysis.  While the author is careful to stress the limitations of his 
results, the potential biases are worth emphasis. 51  Explaining the Yield Spread 
The regressions argue against either the bank arbitrage or Miller I 
models. In my view, the strongest indication is the importance of changes 
in the share of  state-local debt in changes in the yield  spread at all 
maturities. Thus, it is possible to eliminate these two hypotheses with- 
out any appeal to tax events. 
Still, the regressions indicate that tax events are important. The more 
subtle question is whether tax expectations are important, and here I 
think the results speak clearly. One, albeit crude, way of sorting out 
the relative importance of expectations versus actions is to compare 
the effects of policy announcements to those of actual implementation. 
Of  the major tax events analyzed in  table 2.6, eight were announce- 
ments and six were implementations.’ Using model 3 results as the 
guide, we find significant responses to four of the announcements: the 
Kennedy tax cut, the Vietnam War surcharge, the March 1969 House 
decision, and the Long announcement opposing taxation of interest on 
municipal bonds. In contrast, the only policy implementation to show 
significant effects at all maturities is the passage of the Reagan tax cut. 
This is the only instance in which a policy implementation, but not 
announcement, changes the yield spread. It is easy expost to rationalize 
this as reflecting uncertainty about the final form of the tax bill, but 
such temptations are an inherent weakness of this method. 
A  second weakness is apparent in the estimates. It is only a slight 
exaggeration to say that the evidence presented consists of essentially 
four episodes: the Kennedy  State of  the  Union  address, Johnson’s 
announcement of  the surcharge, the March and September 1969 flip- 
flop on the taxation of  interest from municipal bonds, and the August 
1981 passage of  the Reagan tax program.  By  this measure, it takes a 
“big”  tax event to move expected tax rates, and most theories that 
emphasize expectations suggest a continual, subtle reassessment of the 
future. 
This paper raises the hope that it is possible to reduce municipal 
borrowing  costs through  changing the  mix  of  debt maturities.  One 
cannot predict the size of the savings, but this may be asking too much. 
The evidence in this paper supports the importance of expectations, 
with implications beyond the particular subject. Moreover, municipal 
bond market performance has been puzzling, and explicit tests of the 
few available explanations are welcome. Despite any limitations of the 
methods used, the paper makes an important contribution to testing 
the relevant hypotheses. 
Note 
1. The announcements are: May-June  1962, January  1963, January 1967, March 1969, 
September 1969, June 1980, November 1980, and February 1981. This Page Intentionally Left Blank